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CHANGES IN THE ROLES OF COMMON LAW, 
EQUITY, AND STATUTE IN THE 
STUART CENTURY 
HE CHANGES in the constitutional structure of Eng- 
land during the Stuart century seem to be enjoying very 
critical re-examination and re-appraisal, and out of the recent 
studies' much more sympathy for the medieval legal and 
political structures, and for the men who continued to es- 
pouse them in that time of foment, seems to be emerging. 
h/fuch less attention, however, seems to have becn given to 
the impact of these coi~stitutional changes and of the thought 
and circumstances which produced them on the conceived 
roles of courts, chancellor, and parliament in the area of pri- 
vate law. This paper will present some observations on this 
subjecf but without pretense that they should be regarded 
as final or definitive. 
In  today's prevailing political thought the secular state is 
sovereign and law is its product and instrument. In the medi- 
eval constitution, to which that of England conformed, law 
was supreme and the authorities spiritua1 and temporal were 
its instruments. The essence of authority spiritual or temporal 
was jurisdiction, or responsibility for the declaration of the 
law rather than the right to make it." To spiritual authority, 
vested in the Church of Xome, belonged exclusive jurisdic- 
tion to state the revealed law and supreme or final authority, 
even over temporal rulers, to determine the spiritual and 
moral quaIities of all human actions.' To temporal autllority, 
which might be vested in various secuIar political entities, 
belonged jurisdiction to promote and maintain such order or 
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law in the lives of men as, considering the circumstances of 
existence in the particular time and place, would contribute 
most to their common good as men living under God. 
I n  medieval England this temporal jurisdiction was not 
located in any one person or institution; it was distributed 
among the king's courts, the king's chancellor, the king acting 
alone in the area of traditional prerogative, and the king act- 
ing in concert with his council or parliament, all of whom 
acted in accordance with established but dynamic forms and 
procedures themselves regarded as part of the previously 
specified order or law.4 These several institutional entities 
shared the same authority 01 jurisdiction, all being deemed 
to participate in the declaration of a positive law for England 
consistent with English culture and conceived to be just in 
the sense of being in harmony wit11 the Eternal Law. Their 
functions in the exercise of the authority of jurisdiction 
varied, of course, but the variations in function were not con- 
ceived of as differences in purpose or objective.' The courts 
found and applied to particular controversies the law which 
had been specified before, either explicitly or implicitly, by 
custom, judicial action under the writs, or enactments; the 
king's chancellor specified rules of law for causes brought 
before him for which the previously declared law was hade- 
quate to do justice; and the king, usually in parliament, con- 
firmed, specified, or respecified general rules deemed to re- 
flect the true law or good order. The law which these several 
English temporal authorities cooperatively declared repre- 
sented the sum total of those rules of order which reasoned 
judgments on the experiences of English life had indicated 
to be conducive to the common good of men living in Eng- 
1and.Vhis is not to say that English law was the only imag- 
inable just law for man in society; but just as Roman law 
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could be regarded as the embodiment of justice for men in 
the Romance cultures, to be altered only as the changes in 
conditions of life indicated that other specifications would 
accomplish greater justice, so too was English law to be re- 
spected until changes in English life required its alteration. 
As such English law was fundamental law.? It was not un- 
changeable, but no agency of jurisdiction could do more than 
adjust it as necessary for good order, each according to its 
own f ~ n c t i o n . ~  
The Tudors initiated the destruction of this medieval Eng- 
lish Constitution by transferring final spiritual jurisdiction 
from the Church of Rome to authorities formerly possessing 
temporal jurisdiction alone, but left essentially undisturbed 
the traditional distribution of temporal jurisdiction and re- 
spect for the fundamental law. Thus the temporal authori- 
ties collectively became more absolute in the sense that the 
Church could not censure their actions as violations of faith 
or morals, but their respective jurisdictional functions re- 
mained separated and limited by tradition and subject to the 
fundamental English law. The first Stuart, however, chal- 
lenged the sacredness both of this distribution of temporal 
jurisdiction and of the fundamental law. James I not only 
claimed all spiritual and temporal jurisdiction for the person 
of the king, but also claimed the right to ignore the concrete 
fundamental law if he chose and to state the law of the land 
in accordance with his reason and his judgment. He acknowl- 
edged an obligation to declare law and to organize govern- 
mental institutions consistently with the Divine Will, but 
claimed exclusive authority so to do, either alone or through 
such persons as he chose. The fundamental law and the tra- 
ditional distribution of jurisdiction among courts, chancellor, 
and king in council or in parliament could continue at his 
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sufferance, but no longer. The king was under God, but 
sovereign in authority. Positive law would have to be iden- 
tified with the royal will, The jurisdiction of courts, chan- 
cellor, and parliament would be reduced to the exposition, 
interpretation, and application of the royal will. Custom it- 
self would derive its authority from the tolerance or implicit 
approval of the royal will.% 
No single incident more dramatically illustrates this repu- 
diation of the components of the medieval constitution, di- 
vided or distributed jurisdiction under fundamental law, than 
the famous encounter between James I and Chief Justice 
Coke. The king, in a conference with Coke, affirmed his right 
to replace his justices and decide any controversy personally. 
Colce objected that the king did not have power to do so and 
that controversies were to be decided in courts of justice and 
according to law. James replied that he had thought the law 
to be founded on reason, and that he had reason as well as 
the judges. Coke, according to his own account, explained 
that the reason on which the common law was founded was 
an "artificial reason and judgment of law," as opposed to 
mere natural reason, the mastery of which required study 
and experience not possessed by the king. James objected 
that this would place the king under the law, "which was 
treason to affirm." Coke thereupon relied on Bracton's words, 
"That the king ought not to be subject to any man, but under 
God and the law."lo 
I t  is usual to interpret this encounter as indicative of James 
1's challenge to the distribution of jurisdiction and to the fun- 
damental law. What is not always so clearly stated, if at all, 
is the very correct medieval import of Coke's words that the 
common law, which undoubtedly he used here to mean the 
d o l e  of the law of England, was fundamental and binding 
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because it represented the principles and rules of true order 
or law for men in the English culture. Anotller system of law, 
no matter how rational or in keeping with man's nature, 
whether royal law or Roman law, couId not supplant the 
English law without prejudice to Englishmen. 
I t  cannot be said that the Stuarts changed the Tudor con- 
stitution, for their theories never prevailed in fact; but the 
controversies raised by James I and Charles I weakened it by 
raising doubts as to the efficacy of the law as a foundation 
and guarantee of good order. If the Tudors had begun the 
movement by placing final jurisdiction in matters spiritual 
under secular authority, they had not, at least, placed them- 
selves above the fundamental law and the political institu- 
tions which had enjoyed authority of temporal jurisdiction. 
The Stuarts claimed to be above both, rejecting all notion 
of a concrete fundamental law and transforming the temporal 
authority of jurisdiction according to law into an authority 
to declare any scheme of positive law which Stuart reason 
might judge to be consistent with the Divine Will. Had their 
ideas prevailed every institutional means of opposition to a 
law not consistent with good order would have been re- 
moved. In theory the Crown would have been subject to 
Divine Law, but the king would have been its supreme in- 
terpreter. Had the ideas of Hobbes prevailed at this time, 
even this non-institutional limitation on the Crown would 
have been removed and Stuart claims to sovereign jurisdic- 
tion would have been transformed into exclusive sovereign 
power to make the law. But neither the theories of the Stuarts 
nor those of Hobbes met with general favor. Finally it was 
the parliament which emerged with claims of right to sover- 
eign jurisdiction to declare the positive law; and although 
under the influence of Locke a secular natural law began to 
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supplant the Divine Law as the source of the fundamental 
concepts or order, it could truly be said that Parliament's role 
was still regarded as law-declarative rather than law-creative. 
Yet Parliament did not seek the exclusive exercise of its newly 
sovereign jurisdiction; the courts and chancellor continued 
to exercise their former jurisdictional roles. There had been 
a real change, nevertheless. Slowly the courts and chancellor 
came to realize they continued to exercise authority of juris- 
diction not as equals of the parliament, but subject to it, and 
with this realization they slowly began to think of their roles 
in teims of the interpretation and application of law rather 
than its declaration. 
The common law courts when dealing with the unwritten 
or unenacted private law-the common law in the narrow 
sense-at first seemed to feel little impact from the changes 
in fundamental law theory. To the end of the Tudor period 
the unwritten common law was still custom. For the most 
part custom was evidenced by the repeated decisions of the 
courts, and the courts might always consider whether a cus- 
tom as it appeared in their preceding decisions gave rise to 
justice in the particular circumstances at hand. Even a long 
line of decisions could be ignored if to apply the ivle would 
have led to "inconvenience or injustice."ll There was no sug- 
gestion of the 19th century strict rule of precedent that the 
courts are bound by their previous decisions, whether just or 
unjust. In the Exchequer Chamber a decision was referred to 
as "a precedent for all subsequent cases" as early as 1602,12 
but it should be questioned whether this "precedent" was 
deemed to be any more binding on the court than a statute 
would have been on parliament. Plucknett believes nothing 
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of the kind appeared in the King's Bench or Common Pleas 
at this time.13 A few years before, in Slade's Case (1596), a 
decision famous as the starting point of modern contract law, 
Coke had expounded his views on the use of previous de- 
cisions, and he had not held them to be more than persua- 
sive.14 Nevertheless, as the Stuart century advanced there 
was an increasing awareness of some obligation to respect 
previous judicial formulations of the law. A tract written in 
1649 by John Wan, entitled "The Coi~uption and DeEciency 
of the Laws of England," even complained that the justices 
were too prone to follow precedent rather than reason.15 In 
1686 the Exchequer Chamber declared that a rule settled by 
all the judges might not be questioned thereafter;16 in 1670 
Chief Justice Vaughan distinguished rationale and dictum 
and suggested that a court ought to follow its own previous 
decisions, but need not adhere to one by another court if it 
be erroneous.17 Though such statements as these may not 
quite evidence a rule of binding precedent, they do indicate 
a tendency to adhere to previous decisions which go beyond 
respect for custom repeatedly approved as reasonable. I t  
would seem that the claims of parliamentary sovereignty had 
begun to convince the judges they were not participants in 
jurisdiction, but rather expositors of a common law sustained 
if not created by parliamentary will, and which once de- 
clared could not be changed without a parliamentary act. 
Equity theory and practice suffered a much more appre- 
ciable change during the Stuart period than did the common 
law. The decision of James I to permit the Chancellor to be 
judge of his own competence1' opened the way to an enlarge- 
ment of the subject matter of equity. At the same time, how- 
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ever, equity ceased to be the court of conscience which it 
had been declared to be by Christopher St. Germain in his 
Dialogues between a Doctor of Divinity and a Student of the 
Law (1523)" and which it had continued to be until the end 
of the Tudor period. The statements of the chancellors are 
quite instructive on this score. Clarendon in 1663 refused 
relief, though he thought conscience demanded it, because 
he could not find a p r e ~ e d e n t . ~ ~  In 1670 Lord Keeper Bridg- 
man affirmed the need to foIlow precedent even in reply to 
Chief Justice Vaughan's expression of astonishment that pre- 
cedents should be cited in equitySz1 Lord Nottingham just 
two years later articulated the divorce of equity from the 
chancellor's personal appreciation of justice according to 
conscience: "With such a conscience as is only naturalis et 
internu," he declared, "this court has nothing to do; the con- 
science by which I am to proceed is merely civilis et politica, 
and tied to certain measures; and it is infinitely better for the 
public that a trust security or agreement, which is wholly 
secret, should miscarry, than that men should lose their es- 
tates by the mere fancy and imagination of a cl~ance110r."~~ 
This was a long way from the spirit of equity expressed in St. 
Germain. Its very function in the distributed authority of jur- 
isdiction had been vitiated, for the adjustment of the general 
rule of law to justice in the particular case was no more a 
part of legal theory. Sixty-two years later, in 1734, Jekyll, 
Master of the Rolls, insisted that the only discretion which 
could be permitted in Chancery was that according to law 
and right; discretion beyond this point was not in any judicial 
body, not even in the House of Lords in its judicial capac- 
itymZ3 Obviously this statement was stronger even than Not- 
tingham's. It affirmed that parliament alone might enlarge 
upon the law. The jurisdiction of equity in the medieval sense 
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was gone. A11 that remained was the authority to apply and 
adjust the known rules of equity, which thereafter became 
but another branch of the English law, 
I t  would seem difficult to account for this attitude except 
in terns of the influence of the change in thought about the 
constitution and the nature of fundamental law. Before the 
Stuarts the notion of fundamental law included the idea of 
the constant readjustment of the irules of law in the interest 
of good order in the particular case. This was the function 
of the chancellor. Here we have the chancellor deprived of 
authority to do equity. The explanation for this must include, 
at least, a reflection of the feeling that jurisdiction, in the 
medieval sense, if not the power to make law, belongs to the 
parliament alone. 
The developments wit11 regard to the position of statutes 
were not as obvious as those in equity precisely because Par- 
liament claimed only supreme jurisdiction and not exclusive 
jurisdiction to declare the law. I n  this respect it is instructive 
to contrast the changes in the roles of legislative assembly, 
courts, and equity in France after the Revolution of 1769. 
The French bourgeoisie placed in the legislative assembly 
not simply the supreme, but the exclusive jurisdiction to de- 
clare a positive law for France in conformity with secular 
ilatural law. To minimize infringement on this exclusive jur- 
isdiction they enacted extensive systematic legislation, re- 
fused to admit its insufficiency for any situation, and denied 
to the courts any role as interpreter of the law or as dispenser 
of equity. The coui-ts were to apply the law specified by the 
legislature and were not to avoid its words under the pretext 
of following its spirit. Nor could a judge refuse to decide a 
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case on the ground that no law existed on the subject; the 
situation had to be 6tted under a legal textsz4 In England, on 
the other hand, Parliament did not attempt very comprehen- 
sive reforms until the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
I t  was content to allow the courts and the chancellor to apply 
the traditional common law and the settled principles of 
equity. Perhaps a partial explanation for this difference of 
events in England and France lies in the fact that whereas 
in France the pre-revolutionary courts had been viewed as 
instruments of the crown, in England the courts and the 
lawyers for the most part had been champions of parliamen- 
tary right against the claims of the crown. It hardly could 
have been expected that Parliament would then have pro- 
ceeded to destroy its main support. Besides, the common 
lawyers were very influential in Commons and it is well 
known that lawyers abhor radical changes which render val- 
ueless their hard-earned knowledge of their art, In any event, 
the rise of parliamentary supremacy in jurisdiction did not 
result in any great attempt to restate the law. I t  is true that 
Francis Bacon had written of the need for c~dification,'~ but 
he had been on the side of James I. I t  is also true that Crorn- 
well's parliament had proposed extensive legislative reforms, 
but after the Restoration these plans were largely f o r g ~ t t e n . ~ ~  
Thus it is not in the systematization of the law by statutes, nor 
even in their proliferation, that we must look for clues to the 
relation of statutes to the rest of the law in the Stuart century. 
The one factor which seems significant on this point dur- 
ing the Stuart reigns was the controversy over the right of 
the courts to control a statute of parliament or to declare it 
void as being contrary to fundamental law. Indeed, it may 
seem paradoxical that at the same time that parliament was 
coming to be recognized as having the fullness of jurisdiction 
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to declare the law that it was being alleged that parliament 
could not validly make some things law. But there was no 
paradox in this at all. Though the parliament may have ac- 
quired supreme jurisdiction, its function was still jus dicere, 
not jus dare. Whereas it could declare the law as it would as 
long as its specification conformed to just changes in the fun- 
damental law's exposition, it could not make right what was 
intrinsically wrong. Thus early in the reign of James I Par- 
liament had given its approval to a patent of the king per- 
mitting the London College of Surgeons to try and to fine 
persons for practicing without a license from the college and 
to keep a portion of the fine. Acting pursuant to this author- 
ity, the college imposed a fine on one Dr. Bonham. Dr. Bon- 
ham attacked the validity of the college's action and Coke 
ruled it fundamental that no one could be judge in his own 
suit and accordingly that Parliament could not make this the 
law.27 This happened before Parliament achieved sovereign 
jurisdiction, it is true, but the same sentiments were repeated, 
and very strongly, after the Restoration. Thus Vaugllan, C. J., 
in Thomas u. Sorrel1 (l677), stated that Parliament could or- 
der nothing intrinsically wrong, such as "murder, stealing, 
perjury, trespass," and that a law so ordering "would be a 
void law in itself."" Holt, C. J., in City of London 0. Wood 
(1701), voiced the opinion that Parliament could neither per- 
mit one to be judge in his own cause, nor make adultery law- 
f~l;~"nd in Rex v. E a ~ l  of Banbury (l695), Nolt, C. J., has 
been reported to have said it was common for judges to "con- 
strue and expound acts of parliament, and adjudge them to 
be void."30 It has been said that in spite of such expressions 
no English court has ever declared an act of parliament void, 
and this may be literally true; yet to refuse to apply a statute 
as written, though the import of its words be clear, is at least 
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an affirmation that the statute will not be considered enforce- 
able as written; and this would seem to amount to the same 
thing. In any event the courts' view must have been that 
Parliament could not make law, for if it could, the statute's 
justice could not have been discussed; nor could it, obviously, 
have declared a law which was unjust, for this would have 
been invalid as a misuse of function. Thus it would seem rea- 
sonable to conclude that at the end of the Stuart century an 
act of Parliament was still a declaration of law; and the mere 
fact that Parliament was considered to have the exclusive 
sovereign right to declare the law did not deprive the courts 
of the right to state that what a statute declared could not be 
the law. The victoly of Hobbes and his followers was not to 
be until the nineteenth century. Only then did law come to 
be regarded as having its source and norm in the will of the 
secular authorities. 
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